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Evidence on the dynamics of investment-cash flow sensitivity  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
An important debate in the literature relates to the use of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
(ICFS) to measure finance constraint faced by firms. This debate is grounded on four prominent 
issues: a priori sorting of firms, treatment of distressed firms, use of cash flow to represent only 
internal liquidity of firms and restricting firms to a single regime. In this paper we investigate these 
issues using a sample of 2676 Indian manufacturing firms over the period 1994 to 2009. We use 
firm level estimates of ICFS to sort firms into positively cash flow sensitive (PCF-sensitive) group, 
cash flow insensitive (CF-insensitive) group and, negatively cash flow sensitive (NCF-sensitive) 
group. We find that all three group of firms start with high levels of investment. But, only the PCF-
sensitive firms have high level of cash flows. With age, the investment of all three groups of firms 
remains stationary. But, for CF-insensitive firms only the cash flow rises with age. Further, we use a 
multinomial logistic regression to study the determinants of ICFS in the three groups. The results 
suggest that the interpretation of NCF-sensitive, PCF-sensitive and CF-insensitive as distressed, 
financially constrained and financially unconstrained, respectively, can be contested by the data.  
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Evidence on the dynamics of investment-cash flow sensitivity  
1. Introduction  
A recurrent puzzle in the literature is to identify the financially constrained firms from a 
sample of firms. Since finance constraint is not observable, most researchers use investment-cash 
flow sensitivity (ICFS), as the metric, to investigate the presence of finance constraint in firms.1 The 
argument is– firms operating in imperfect capital markets (i.e., firms facing the problems of 
asymmetric information) may find external funds either unavailable or very expensive. This is 
because the suppliers of external funds, who are unsure about a firm’s project quality, seek a 
premium to compensate for the losses that might arise by funding risky projects. This premium 
precludes some firms from making investments that they would have chosen to make, had funds 
been available. Such firms are interpreted as financially constrained against the unconstrained 
firms which pay negligible premium. Investments by constrained firms, as a consequence of high 
premium on external funds, are likely to be highly correlated with the cash flows where cash flows 
are taken as a proxy for internal liquidity. The usual practice, for validating this hypothesis, is to 
sort the sample of firms into groups based on their likelihood of facing financing constraints using 
some variable like dividend payout, size, group affiliation, age, export sensitivity, commercial paper 
rating etc. The group of firms for which ICFS is significantly higher is interpreted as financially 
constrained and the group of firms for which ICFS is insignificant is interpreted as financially 
unconstrained. This is known as excess sensitivity hypothesis in the literature. 
There is significant amount of work which confirms to the excess sensitivity hypothesis. 
However, there are also some works which argue that ICFS is a noisy measure of financial 
constraints.2 The debate on this issue revolves around three major arguments: firstly, cash flow is a 
noisy variable to measure finance constraint faced by firms since, apart from signaling change in 
internal liquidity, it also signals growth opportunities of firms. This is because firms which are 
younger and smaller would possibly react more to an innovation in cash flows since it provides a 
greater revision of expected profitability [Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)]. So, we may find the 
correlation between investment and cash flows to vary across subsample of firms but for reason 
                                                             
1 For a comprehensive literature survey see Hubbard (1998); Lensink, Bo and Sterken (2001) and; Calcagnini, 
and Saltari (2010). 
2 See footnote 1 for references of such works. 
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that has nothing to do with financing constraints. Secondly, sorting of firms into constrained and 
unconstrained groups, based on some a priori measure, implies an implicit assumption of 
monotonicity of financing constraint with the sorting variable(s). On contrary, Cleary, Povel and 
Raith (2007) and Hovakimian (2009) suggest a U-shaped investment-cash flow sensitivity curve 
with respect to the sorting variables. Therefore the monotonicity assumption may give biased 
estimates. Thirdly, conditions leading to finance constraint may change with any new shock, 
positive or negative, affecting the firm over time. Not allowing firms to be financially constrained in 
one period and unconstrained in other period is too restrictive [Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006)]. 
There is also a debate on the treatment of distressed firms in the analysis of ICFS in 
investigating financial constraint faced by firms.3 This stems from the contradictory findings of 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1998) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) in their investigations of 
financing constraint using ICFS as the metric. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, using dividend payout 
to sort firms, show significantly greater ICFS for firms that pay low dividends than the firms that 
pay high dividends. They argue that since dividends and investment are competing uses of funds, 
firms facing higher premium should choose low dividend payout ratios. On the other hand, Kaplan 
and Zingales, show that firms that have greater ICFS are less likely to be constrained than firms 
which have smaller ICFS. They argue that high ICFS is driven by managers’ choice to rely primarily 
on internal cash flow to invest despite the availability of additional low cost external funds. In the 
resolution of this debate, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) point out that the firms which are 
identified by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) as financially constrained are actually distressed, whereas 
they did not consider distressed firms for their exercise. So, an analysis of financial constraint faced 
by firms must leave out distressed firms because, at margin, a dollar from cash flows is less likely to 
be invested if a firm is in financial distress.  
In this paper, our attempt is to investigate the determinants of ICFS of Indian firms without 
relying on ex ante classification of firms into constrained, unconstrained and distressed groups. The 
Indian economy provides a relevant case study for this analysis because since the onset of market-
oriented reforms of 1991 banks and other financial institutions were given considerable freedom in 
deciding whom to lend and how much to lend. Specially, there has been a strong tendency on the 
                                                             
3 A firm is defined as distressed in a period if the claims of its creditors are broken or honored with difficulty. 
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part of the Government to move away from state control on the manufacturing sector by allowing 
greater flexibility with respect to investment decisions and choice of capital structure. More 
importantly, to the best of our knowledge, most works on India are open to the criticisms noted 
above.4 Specifically, they use cash flows to measure internal liquidity of firms without accounting 
for the information contained in it about growth opportunities of firms. Also, their framework 
assumes a monotonic pattern of ICFS with the sorting variable(s) and they do not allow firms to 
change regime in the sample period. Therefore, this exercise, by directly investing the ICFS of firms, 
is likely to fill a potentially significant gap in the literature. The analysis uses a sample of 2676 
Indian manufacturing firms over the period 1994 to 2009.  
We use firm level estimates of ICFS to sort firms into positively cash flow sensitive (PCF-
sensitive) group, cash flow insensitive (CF-insensitive) group and, negatively cash flow sensitive 
(NCF-sensitive) group. This grouping of firms is important because these groups are interpreted 
differently in the literature. The interpretation of PCF-sensitive firms and CF-insensitive firms is in 
line with the arguments made above, i.e., the PCF-sensitive firms are considered financially 
constrained whereas the CF-insensitive firms are considered to be operating in a perfect capital 
market. NCF-sensitive firms are much less researched compared to the other two groups.5 It is 
argued that such firms have high growth opportunities but small internal funds at start-up. So, they 
rely mainly on external sources for their investment needs. Lenders (or investors), to leverage such 
needs, require their investments to be large enough to generate revenue for the repayment of loans. 
As such firms mature, their cash flows rise but their growth opportunities fall. On account of rising 
debt obligations and falling growth opportunities, such firms are likely to be distressed since their 
probability of default in response to a negative shock is high. However, since we directly investigate 
the ICFS of firms in the three groups, we keep an open mind to evaluate these arguments in our 
analysis.  
We find that at start-up the NCF-sensitive firms have positively significant investment but 
negatively significant cash flows implying they are mainly financed by external sources. Moreover, 
this negative relationship forms a pattern since both the variables remain stationary with age. The 
                                                             
4 For works on India see Athey and Laumas (1994); Ganesh-Kumar, Sen and Vaidya (2001); Lensink, van der 
Molen, and Gangopadhyay (2003); Bhaduri (2005) and George, Kabir, and Qian (2011).  
5 We are aware of four such works discussing NCF-sensitive firms in some detail. These are Allayannis and 
Mozumdar (2004); Bhagat, Moyen and Suh (2005); Cleary, Povel and Raith (2007); Hovakimian (2009).  
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CF-insensitive firms start with high level of investment and an insignificant level of cash flows. But, 
their investments remain stationary and the cash flows rise with age. The PCF-sensitive firms start 
with higher level of investment than the other two groups and their cash flow level is also higher. 
But, their investments and cash flows both remain stationary with age. Further, we use a 
multinomial logistic regression model to study the determinants of ICFS in the three groups. The 
results suggest that the interpretation of NCF-sensitive, PCF-sensitive and CF-insensitive as 
distressed, financially constrained and financially unconstrained, respectively, can be contested by 
the data. We suspect that the possible reasons for this could be, as argued before, the use of cash 
flows to measure internal liquidity of firms without accounting for the information contained in it 
about growth opportunities of firms; and restricting firms in a single regime over the sample 
period. Moreover, the results also suggest evidence contrary to the assumption of monotonic 
pattern of investment-cash flow sensitivity with some of the sorting variable(s). 
This work is closest in spirit to Hovakimian (2009). She also uses firm level estimates of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity to sort firms into PCF-sensitive, CF-insensitive and NCF-sensitive 
group. However, this paper differs from Hovakimian (2009) in the following two ways: First, she 
uses error term from the homogeneous slope regression model of investment on variables other 
than cash flows after controlling for fixed firm and time effects to construct ICFS of firms. We, on 
the other hand, use a variable slope regression model, which allows the firms to have 
heterogeneous slopes for the variables in the model, to find the estimates of ICFS. We show that a 
variable slope regression model fits data better than the homogeneous slope model. Second, she 
uses Tobin’s q to represent the growth opportunities of the firms. However, since there are many 
unlisted firms in our sample, it has not been possible to get an estimate of the Tobin’s q for all the 
firms. Therefore, we use sales accelerator to represent growth opportunities of firms. For a smaller 
sub-sample of firms that are listed we conduct the entire empirical exercise using the Tobin’s q. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two discusses the methods of 
measuring firm-level ICFS. Section three discusses the dataset and the variables. Section four 
outlines descriptive statistics and preliminary analysis. Section five examines how the relationship 
between investment and cash flows change with age for the three ICFS group of firms. Section six 
presents the estimation exercise. Section seven concludes the paper. 
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2. Firm level estimates of ICFS 
For the measurement of ICFS there are two approaches that we can follow. First, we can 
control for the factors other than cash flows in a homogeneous slope regression model and use the 
error term to construct the measure as suggested by Hovakimian (2009). Second, we can use a 
variable slope regression model, which allows the firms to have heterogeneous slopes for the 
variables in the model, to get estimates of ICFS from the model itself. These methods are outlined 
below: 
2.1. Firm level ICFS using homogeneous slope regression model 
Cash flow is not the only factor that may affect firms’ investment. So, we can estimate the 
following regression to control for the other factors: 
   	 
  
In equation (1) Iit is investment by firm i at time t. The list of control variables represented 
by the matrix  is the matrix of control variables, 
 is the matrix of slope coefficients and  is the 
error term which is assumed to be white noise.  
The error term from this regression, , can be used to construct ICFS metric: 
 	   

  




 
here, S is the sensitivity metric, CF represents cash flows and K is beginning-of-period capital stock. 
i denotes firm, t denotes year and n is the total number of firms. By construction, S takes high values 
for firms that invest more when their cash flows are high and less when their cash flows are low, 
after controlling for the other factors. The intuition for equation (2) is as follows: if a firm’s 
investment is not influenced by its cash flows then its average  in the periods when cash flows 
are high should not be significantly different from its average  in the periods when cash flows are 
low. Consequently, average  weighted by cash flows should not be significantly different from the 
simple average . However, if a firm’s investment is positively (negatively) correlated with its cash 
flows then average  weighted by cash flows should be higher (lower) than the simple average . 
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2.2. Firm level ICFS using variable slope regression model 
The variable slope model, compared to the homogeneous slope model, allows the 
construction of the ICFS metric from the model itself. The specification of the variable slope 
regression model is: 
   	 !  
 "  #
This specification augments the specification in the equation (1) by including cash flow variable 
() in the equation. The ICFS metric can be computed as the sum of ! and " .  
The advantage with the homogeneous slope model is that it requires less number of 
parameters to be estimated since structuring all variables in X to have heterogeneous slopes across 
firms would require too many parameters to estimate. As an alternative, we can assume that only 
CF, which is our main variable of interest, has variable slope across firms as suggested by Lee 
(2002). This is important because if the true model has variable slope coefficients, a homogeneous 
slope coefficient may give biased estimates [Baltagi (2008)]. Also, since the variable slope model 
uses information from the specification rather than the error term to give the ICFS estimates, it 
retains its uniqueness, which may be contested in the case of homogeneous slope model.6 Both the 
models in equation (1) and (2) can be estimated with fixed firm effects, industry effects, time effects 
and robust standard errors. A likelihood ratio test can be performed to choose a better fit among 
the two methods. 
3. Dataset and variables 
We use PROWESS, corporate data directory of the Center for Monitoring of Indian Economy 
(CMIE) as the major data source. It contains detailed information on over 20,000 Indian firms. It 
includes a normalised database of the financials covering around 1,500 data items and ratios per 
company. We also use Reserve Bank of India (RBI) monthly bulletins to get data on price deflators 
for constructing replacement value of capital stock. Our study is based on major industries in the 
manufacturing sector from 1994 to 2009.  
                                                             
6 The specifications in both the equations leave out some information (say, for example, credit rating of firms) 
because of data availability issue. The magnitude of bias is likely to be less in the case of the variable slope 
model. 
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The sample includes even those firms that no longer exist, so there is no survival bias. 
However, we do restrict our sample in the following ways: first, we require sale of goods to 
contribute at least 75 per cent of the total sales of the firm for at least two-third of the sample 
period. This is to ensure that the firms are mainly into manufacturing business and they have not 
diversified into some other activities such as trading. Second, we consider only private firms. Public 
and foreign firms are excluded since Investments by such firms are directly controlled by the 
Ministry of Industry and a foreign parent company, respectively. They cannot be analysed in the 
framework of this study. Third, to drop firms undergoing restructuring, we require firms should not 
have unreasonable jump in manufactured sales.7 Fourth, we drop firms which do not have at least 
four years of continuous data. Additionally, to take care of the extreme values, we replace the 
extreme one percent observations at both ends by the numbers at the previous percentile.  
Among the variables used in the analysis of ICFS, investment is defined as the change in 
replacement value of capital stock. We use perpetual inventory method to measure replacement 
value of capital stock.8 Cash flow is defined as the sum of retained profits and depreciation. Besides 
cash flows, which is a flow measure of liquidity (besides capturing information on growth 
opportunities of firms), we also use slack which is a stock measure of liquidity. Slack is defined as 
the sum of cash and marketable securities. There are two contrasting strands in literature on the 
effect of slack on firms’ investment. Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) and Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) suggest that investment by firms with ample cash reserves is not limited by a lack of finance. 
However, Fazzari and Petersen (1993); Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1996) argue that 
firms which anticipate a shortage of liquidity  for investment needs in the near future, maintain 
high levels of slack. 
Accelerator and Tobin’s q are expected to affect firm investment as proxy variables for 
growth opportunities. Accelerator is defined as the difference of operating income (sales) of a firm 
                                                             
7 We allow up to 1000 percent jump if manufactured sales is up to Rs. 10 million; 500 percent if manufactured 
sales is between Rs. 10 million plus to Rs. 50 million; 300 percent if manufactured sales is between Rs. 50 
million plus to Rs. 100 million; 200 percent if manufactured sales is between Rs. 100 million plus to Rs. 250 
million and; 100 percent if manufactured sales is above Rs. 250 million. We tried various other numbers but 
these numbers are chosen to include maximum possible number of observations in the sample and yet 
putting a restriction on restructuring firms.  
8 This is standard in the literature. For a comprehensive note on the construction of replacement value of 
capital stock see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Gomes (2001). Henceforth, capital means 
replacement value of capital stock in the paper. 
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in two consecutive years. Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of market value of a firm to its book value 
of assets. Market value is calculated by adding market value of equity and book value of debt. Firms 
with high growth opportunities indicate further scope for profitable investments. If such firms are 
well recognised by the market, it is less likely they would face problems in raising funds 
[Hovakimian and Titman (2006)]. However, their inability to signal scope for profitable 
investments may cause a bottleneck in raising funds.  
We use two stock measures of firms’ leverage- short term debt and long term debt. Short 
term debt is defined as the loans taken from all sources for a period of less than 12 months where 
as long term debt is defined as the loans taken from all sources for a period of more than 12 
months. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) suggest that firms with high debt signal 
higher probability of default during a business downturn. Therefore, they may face higher hurdles 
in accessing external sources of capital. However, Lensink, Bo and Sterken (2001) suggest that 
debts help in avoiding agency problem between stock holders and managers of the firm by 
disciplining the later. Hence, such firms are less likely to face hurdles in accessing external sources 
of capital. We also use interest coverage as the flow measure of leverage which represents debt 
servicing by firms. It is measured as the ratio of interest accrued to profits before taxes, interest 
payments, dividends and amortization (PBTIDA).  
Firms’ size and maturity are two other variables which are extensively used in the 
literature. Natural log of sales is used to represent size of firms. Firms with greater size command 
more resources and get more analysts’ coverage than firms with smaller size. Hence, they are less 
likely to be constrained by funds [Hovakimian and Titman (2006); Devereux and Schiantarelli 
(1990); Oliner and Rudebusch (1992)]. Natural log of age is used to represent maturity of firms 
where is age is taken from the year of incorporation of the firms to the year 2010. For similar 
reasons as size, mature firms are less likely to face problems in raising funds. Along with size and 
age, asset tangibility also assesses firms’ ability to obtain external capital. Asset tangibility is 
defined as the ratio of gross fixed assets to capital stock of the firms. Higher asset tangibility allows 
firms to borrow more since it increases the value that can be captured by creditors in default state 
[Almeida and Campello (2007); Hovakimian (2009)]. 
Among the additional variables, we use dividend payout, export sensitivity and group 
affiliation of firms. Dividend payout is defined as the sum of common and preference dividends. 
Since dividends and investment are competing uses of funds, firms facing hurdles in finding 
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external finance should choose low dividend payout [Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)]. Export sensitivity is defined as the ratio of export of goods (fob) 
to sales. Firms which export more are more capable of surviving and doing well. Such firms are less 
likely to be constrained by funds from external sources [Ganesh-Kumar, Sen and Vaidya (2001); 
Silva (2011)]. Group affiliation is defined as a dummy which takes value 1 for a firm belonging to a 
group. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991); Lensink, van der Molen, and Gangopadhyay (2003) 
suggest that group firms have their internal capital market which acts as an additional source of 
funds. In contrary, Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), Molen and Lensink (2005) argue that 
some business groups mainly exist to the benefit of the typically small number of investors that 
control a group leading to the expropriation of minority shareholders. So, the complicated 
ownership structures of business groups may lead to more severe agency conflicts.  
4. Descriptive statistics and preliminary analysis 
In table 1 we present the summary statistic for the ICFS metric using alternative methods 
discussed in the section 2.9 The variables which are included as controls include- accelerator, log 
sales, log age, gross fixed assets, short term debt, long term debt, interest coverage, slack, dividend 
payout, export sensitivity and group affiliation. All variables except log sales, interest coverage and 
export sensitivity are deflated by beginning-of-period capital stock. Both the models are estimated 
with fixed firm effects, industry effects, time effects and robust standard errors. The likelihood ratio 
test clearly suggests that variable slope model fits the data better than the homogeneous slope 
model. Moreover, ICFS estimates, using homogeneous slope model, at the extreme percentiles 
cannot be interpreted as reasonable numbers. Therefore, for all our subsequent analysis we use 
ICFS metric derived from the variable slope model. 
We break the sample of firms into three groups, PCF-sensitive, NCF-sensitive and CF-
insensitive, based on the following rule: first, we divide the positive and negative ICFS scores of 
firms into twenty clusters each, using hierarchical clustering technique and call them above-zero 
and below-zero clusters, respectively. Second, since finding the boundaries of the CF-insensitive 
group would get us all the three groups, we use different combinations from above-zero and below-
                                                             
9 The regression results are not presented in the paper to save space, they are available upon request. 
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zero clusters to get an insensitive cash flow coefficient in investment regression as specified by the 
following equation: 
   	 !$
%& ' ()*  
  + 
This specification is same as in equation (1) except we also have cash flows () as one of the 
independent variables here.10 Third, the stopping rule for the exercise is that we must find 
positively significant, negatively significant and insignificant cash flow coefficient for PCF-sensitive, 
NCF-sensitive and CF-insensitive groups, respectively, in investment regressions.  
Table 1: Summary statistics for ICFS metric  
 
Homogeneous slope model Variable slope model 
Maximum 34.1935 0.1516 
p99 1.5116 0.0828 
p90 0.1924 0.0443 
p75 0.0569 0.0318 
Mean -0.0028 0.0241 
Median -0.0017 0.0233 
p25 -0.0612 0.0160 
p10 -0.2042 0.0060 
p1 -1.3747 -0.0355 
Minimum -31.4918 -0.0723 
Standard Deviation 1.2688 0.0187 
Number of Observations 25966 25949 
Number of firms 2680 2676 
LR test for variable slope (Prob > chi2) 0.0000 
Note: This table presents the summery statistics for ICFS estimates using alternative methods discussed in 
the Section 2. The models are estimated with fixed firm effects, industry effects, time effects and robust 
standard errors. 
Following the aforementioned steps, we classify firms as PCF-sensitive if ICFS is greater 
than 0.0397, NCF-sensitive if ICFS is less than -0.0022 and as CF-insensitive if ICFS lies between -
                                                             
10 Here our motive is to investigate the ICFS for the three groups. So, we use specification as in the equation 
(4) rather than as in the equation (3). 
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0.0022 and 0.0397.11 With these thresholds 149 firms are classified as NCF-sensitive, 2161 firms 
are classified as CF-insensitive and 366 firms are classified as PCF-sensitive. The investment 
regression in table 2 confirms this partitioning. This also suggests that the results obtained by 
splitting sample basexd on ICFS is directly comparable to those obtained in the existing literature 
which studies firms’ financial constraints using ex ante criteria for separation.  
Table 2: Investment regressions for full sample and ICFS-groups 
Dependent variable: Investment/K Full Sample NCF-Sensitive CF- Insensitive PCF- Sensitive 
Cash flow/K 0.0015 -0.1012*** -0.0087 0.1165*** 
Log sales 0.0220*** 0.0293*** 0.0182*** 0.0285*** 
Accelerator/K 0.0058*** 0.0033 0.0053*** 0.0090*** 
Short term debt/K -0.0247*** -0.0209** -0.0243*** -0.0280*** 
Long term debt/K 0.0034 0.0036 0.0070* 0.0003 
Slack/K -0.0148*** -0.0120 -0.0178*** -0.0156 
Tangible assets/K -0.0207*** -0.0182* -0.0270*** -0.0138** 
Dividend payout/K 0.0762* 0.0951 0.0374 0.0539 
Interest coverage -0.0057** -0.0122 -0.0025 -0.0175*** 
Export sensitivity 0.0054 -0.0256 0.0044 0.0576 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of Observations 25949 1534 20922 3493 
Number of Firms 2676 149 2161 366 
Note: This table presents the results of regressions on investment using complete sample and then using each 
investment-cash flow sensitivity groups. Estimation is done with fixed firm effects, industry effects, time 
effects and robust standard errors. Variables are defined in section 2. Two variables, log age and group 
affiliation, are dropped because of high collinearity with the fixed firm effects.  ***, ** and * represent level of 
significance at 0.1%, 1% and 5%, respectively.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of variables for the complete sample and for each 
of the ICFS groups. The table indicates that the PCF-sensitive firms, on average, are bigger in terms 
of cash flows, growth opportunities, leverage variables, tangibility and export sensitivity; and 
smaller in terms of maturity and debt service burden than the CF-insensitive firms. On the other 
hand, NCF-sensitive firms, on average, are bigger in terms of cash flows, maturity, dividend payout 
and debt service burden; and smaller in terms of operating income than CF-insensitive firms. 12  
                                                             
11 Although the -0.0022 and 0.0397 cutoff levels are ad hoc, further results are not significantly sensitive to 
reasonable alternative choices of cut-off levels. 
12 Negative value (-0.0040) for interest coverage for NCF-sensitive firms indicate that such firms, on average, 
are loss making firms.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of full sample and ICFS-groups 
Panel A: Full Sample  
Variables Maximum Mean Median Minimum SD 
Investment/K   0.6054 0.0972 0.0554 -0.3022 0.1628 
Cash flow/K  2.2660 0.1466 0.1127 -1.2215 0.3981 
Log sales 7.6132 3.5545 3.6689 -2.3026 1.8417 
Accelerator/K 9.6799 0.4765 0.1810 -4.8491 1.6975 
Log age 5.2204 3.3619 3.2581 0.6931 0.5036 
Short term debt/K 5.1653 0.5958 0.3667 0.0000 0.7928 
Long term debt/K 6.5322 0.6125 0.4162 0.0000 0.7891 
Slack/K 4.9954 0.2576 0.0625 0.0000 0.6708 
Tangible assets/K 10.0478 1.8244 1.4403 1.0659 1.2595 
Dividend payout/K 0.3563 0.0217 0.0000 0.0000 0.0538 
Interest coverage 1.7925 0.0268 0.0000 -2.0000 0.4347 
Export Sensitivity 0.9336 0.1281 0.0074 0.0000 0.2302 
No. of observations 25949 
No. of firms 2676 
 
Panel B: NCF-sensitive group  
Variables Maximum Mean Median Minimum SD 
Investment/K   0.6054 0.0597 0.0354 -0.3022 0.1929 
Cash flow/K  2.2660 0.2734* 0.1550* -1.2215 0.6912 
Log sales 7.6132 3.3157* 3.4509* -2.3026 1.9835 
Accelerator/K 9.6799 0.8263 0.2063* -4.8491 2.8580 
Log age 4.7005 3.4252* 3.3322* 1.7918 0.5117 
Short term debt/K 5.1653 0.8620* 0.3926 0.0000 1.2254 
Long term debt/K 6.5322 0.8290 0.3508* 0.0000 1.2837 
Slack/K 4.9954 0.6769 0.1443 0.0000 1.2317 
Tangible assets/K 10.0478 2.4401 1.7047* 1.0659 1.9351 
Dividend payout/K 0.3563 0.0493* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0988 
Interest coverage 1.7925 -0.0040* 0.0000* -2.0000 0.4273 
Export Sensitivity 0.9336 0.1413 0.0017* 0.0000 0.2612 
No. of observations 1534 
No. of firms 149 
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Panel C: CF-insensitive group  
Variables Maximum Mean Median Minimum SD 
Investment/K   0.6054 0.0899 0.0519 -0.3022 0.1476 
Cash flow/K  2.2660 0.1278 0.1064 -1.2215 0.3317 
Log sales 7.6132 3.5717 3.6836 -2.3026 1.8091 
Accelerator/K 9.6799 0.4106 0.1689 -4.8491 1.4821 
Log age 5.2204 3.3668 3.2581 0.6931 0.5065 
Short term debt/K 5.1653 0.5507 0.3541 0.0000 0.7120 
Long term debt/K 6.3844 0.5646 0.4036 0.0000 0.6936 
Slack/K 4.9954 0.2001 0.0569 0.0000 0.5290 
Tangible assets/K 10.0478 1.7197 1.4100 1.0659 1.0663 
Dividend payout/K 0.3563 0.0185 0.0000 0.0000 0.0462 
Interest coverage 1.7925 0.0321 0.0000 -2.0000 0.4323 
Export Sensitivity 0.9336 0.1247 0.0075 0.0000 0.2243 
No. of observations 20922 
No. of firms 2161 
 
Panel D: PCF-sensitive group  
Variables Maximum Mean Median Minimum SD 
Investment/K   0.6054 0.1578 0.1103*# -0.3022 0.2130 
Cash flow/K  2.2660 0.2035*# 0.1621*# -1.2215 0.5444 
Log sales 7.6132 3.5563# 3.7046# -2.3026 1.9608 
Accelerator/K 9.6799 0.7174* 0.3071*# -4.8491 2.1275 
Log age 4.9904 3.3042*# 3.2581*# 2.0794 0.4773 
Short term debt/K 5.1653 0.7492* 0.4636* 0.0000 0.9524 
Long term debt/K 6.5167 0.8047* 0.5366*# 0.0000 0.9744 
Slack/K 4.9954 0.4182 0.0877*# 0.0000 0.9371 
Tangible assets/K 10.0478 2.1808* 1.6026*# 1.0659 1.7240 
Dividend payout/K 0.3563 0.0289# 0.0000*# 0.0000 0.0629 
Interest coverage 1.7925 0.0082*# 0.0000* -2.0000 0.4509 
Export Sensitivity 0.9336 0.1432* 0.0100*# 0.0000 0.2494 
No. of observations 3493 
No. of firms 366 
Note: The table presents the descriptive statistics of variables for the complete sample and then for each ICFS 
groups. The variables are defined in section 2. * represents level of significance at 5% for difference from CF-
insensitive firms. # represents level of significance at 5% for difference from NCF-sensitive firms. 
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There are significant differences between PCF-sensitive and NCF-firms too. The PCF-
sensitive firms, on average, have higher operating income but have smaller cash flows, maturity, 
dividend payout and debt service burden. Overall, on account of high leverage and debt service 
burden, the NCF-sensitive firms are likely to be most constrained followed by PCF-sensitive firms. 
But, the same cannot be said by looking at other variables such as operating income and cash flows. 
Importantly, however, we can notice that ICFS is non-monotonic with respect to all considered 
variables except investment expenditure and maturity.  
5. What drives the relationship between investment and cash flows for the 
three ICFS groups 
To explore what drives the relationship between investment and cash flows for the three 
ICFS group, we estimate the following model: 
,-.-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01234256-
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In Equation (5), the ,-.-/-01234256- is investment or cash flow for firm i at time t, deflated by 
the beginning of period capital stock and  is the error term. 89-9404:40;/<==; and 
?9-9404:40;/<==; and 49-9404:-/<==; are set to one if the firm is classified as NCF-
sensitive, PCF-sensitive, or CF-insensitive, respectively. Age is number of years since the 
incorporation of the firm. 
The estimation results are presented in the table 4. At start-up the NCF-sensitive firms have 
positively significant investment but negatively significant cash flows implying they are mainly 
financed by external sources. Moreover, this forms a pattern and drives the negative relationship 
between investment and cash flows for such firms since both the variables remain stationary with 
age. But, this is contrary to the experiences in the developed countries where such firms are found 
to have falling investment and rising cash flows with age [Hovakimian (2009)]. 
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Table 4: Investment and cash flow of the three groups with age 
 
Dependent variable - 
Investment 
Dependent variable - 
Cash flow 
NCF- Sensitivity Dummy 0.1732* -0.0446* 
CF- Insensitivity Dummy 0.1812*** -0.0092 
PCF- Sensitivity Dummy 0.2358*** 0.3961*** 
Age* NCF- Sensitivity Dummy 0.0014 -0.0041 
Age* CF- Insensitivity Dummy -0.0007 0.0025* 
Age* PCF- Sensitivity Dummy  -0.0017 -0.0031 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of NCF-sensitive firms 149 
Number of CF-insensitive firms 2161 
Number of PCF-sensitive firms 366 
Note: This table presents the effect of age on investment and cash flow in the three group of firms based on 
their ICFS scores. ***, ** and * represent level of significance at 0.1% 1% and 5% respectively. 
The estimates with CF-insensitive firms suggest that such firms start with high level of 
investment and an insignificant level of cash flows. With age, their investments remain stationary 
and the cash flows rise. This comes in support of an insignificant relationship between investment 
and cash flows for such firms. The estimates with PCF-sensitive firms suggest that such firms start 
with higher level of investment than the other two groups and their cash flow level is also higher. 
With age, their investments and cash flows both remain stationary. This comes in support of a 
positive relationship between investment and cash flows for such firms. However, if the pattern of 
investment and cash flows, as noted in the table 4, is driving the reputation of these two groups of 
firms in the credit market, it is less likely to interpret CF-insensitive and PCF-sensitive firms as 
financially unconstrained and financially constrained firm, respectively. It rather comes in support 
of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) finding that high ICFS is driven by managers’ choice to rely primarily 
on internal cash flows to invest despite the availability of additional low cost external funds. It also 
comes in support of the growing literature which suggests that cash flow is noisy variable to 
represent only internal liquidity of firms, ignoring the information about growth opportunities 
contained in it [Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Hovakimian and Titman (2006)]. 
5. Determinants of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
In this section we investigate the propensity of firms being in any particular group 
compared to the other groups. First, we use a multinomial logistic regression to examine the factors 
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that are likely to influence firms in being classified as PCF-sensitive or NCF-sensitive to the base 
case of being CF-insensitive.13 Next, we contrast between NCF-sensitive and PCF-sensitive firms by 
using a simple logistic regression. Since there are many unlisted firms in our sample, it has not been 
possible to get an estimate of the Tobin’s q to represent their growth opportunities for all the firms. 
Therefore, we use sales accelerator to represent growth opportunities of firms. For a smaller sub-
sample of firms that are listed we conduct the entire empirical exercise using the Tobin’s q together 
with the sales accelerator.  
5.1. Determinants of ICFS for complete sample of listed and unlisted firms 
The results from the multinomial logistic regression are in table 5. The independent 
variables for the regressions are same as used in the regression in table 2. Contrasting the PCF-
sensitive versus from CF-insensitive firm, it suggests that firms with higher cash flows, leverage, 
tangible assets, export sensitivity and firms with group affiliation are more likely to be PCF-
sensitive than CF-insensitive. It also suggests that firms with higher maturity and debt service 
burden are less likely to be PCF-sensitive than CF-insensitive. If we interpret the PCF-sensitive 
firms as financially constrained and the CF-insensitive firms as financially unconstrained, some of 
these variables are contrary to the popular notion in the literature. Specifically, firms with higher 
cash flows, more tangibility, lower debt service burden and higher export sensitivity are argued as 
financially unconstrained in the literature which the results here find otherwise. 
The second column of Table 5, contrasting between NCF-sensitive and CF-insensitive firms, 
suggests that the firms with higher maturity, dividend payout and firms with group affiliation are 
more likely to be NCF-sensitive than CF-insensitive. It also suggests that firms with higher cash 
flows and operating income are less likely to be NCF-sensitive than CF-insensitive. If we interpret 
the NCF-sensitive firms as distressed and the CF-insensitive firms as financially unconstrained, 
some of these variables are contrary to the popular notion in the literature. Specifically, firms with 
                                                             
13 If the groups are to be interpreted based on financing constraints, the firms in the three groups may be 
competing for external funds. In an alternative scenario, there may be within group competition between 
firms for funds if the differences (say, on reputation of firms) are explicit to the credit market. These 
possibilities need an investigation of the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternative assumption 
(IIA). If this assumption is violated estimation would require an alternative specific multinomial logistic 
regression or an ordered logistic regression. We performed Hausman test and Small-Hsiao test to check for 
this. The tests could not reject IIA hypothesis. For details on these tests see MLOGTEST in STATA.  
18 
 
higher maturity and dividend payout are argued as financially unconstrained in the literature, 
which the results here find otherwise.  
Table 5: Multinomial Logistic Regression (Full Sample) 
Dependent variable: ICFS-dummy PCF- Sensitive NCF-Sensitive 
Cash flow/K 0.0222*** -0.0267** 
Log sales -0.0076 -0.0753*** 
Accelerator/K 0.0012 0.0005 
Log age -0.2352*** 0.2120*** 
Short term debt/K 0.0089* 0.0105 
Long term debt/K 0.0085** 0.0014 
Slack/K -0.0027 0.0178 
Tangible assets 0.0227*** -0.0032 
Dividend payout/K -0.0890 0.5364** 
Interest coverage -0.1438*** 0.0156 
Export sensitivity 0.0764* 0.0526 
Group affiliation 0.1203** 0.2228*** 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Number of NCF-sensitive firms 149 
Number of CF-insensitive firms 2161 
Number of PCF-sensitive firms 366 
Note: This table presents the results of multinomial logistic regression with CF-insensitive firms as base 
group. Estimation is done with fixed firm effects, industry effects, time effects and robust standard errors. 
Variables are defined in section 2. ***, ** and * represent level of significance at 0.1% 1% and 5% 
respectively. 
In order to explore whether there are significant differences between PCF-sensitive and 
NCF-sensitive firms, we estimate of a simple logistic regression. The results are presented in the 
table 6. It suggests that firms with higher cash flows, operating income and lower maturity, 
dividend payout and debt service burden are more likely to be PCF-sensitive than NCF-sensitive. If 
we interpret the NCF-sensitive firms as more financially constrained or distressed than the PCF-
sensitive firms, some of these variables are contrary to the popular notion in the literature. 
Specifically, firms with higher maturity and dividend payout are argued as less financially 
constrained in the literature, which the results here find otherwise. 
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Table 6: Logistic Regression (Full Sample) 
Dependent variable: ICFS-dummy Coefficients 
Cash flow/K 0.0538*** 
Log sales 0.0343* 
Accelerator/K -0.0002 
Log age -0.4139*** 
Short term debt/K -0.0049 
Long term debt/K 0.0073 
Slack/K -0.0235 
Asset tangibility 0.0226 
Dividend payout/K -0.5302** 
Interest coverage -0.1600** 
Export sensitivity 0.0655 
Group Affiliation -0.0558 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Number of NCF-sensitive firms 149 
Number of PCF-sensitive firms 366 
Note: This table presents the results of a simple logistic regression to investigate a firm’s propensity to be 
classified as PCF-sensitive as opposed to NCF-sensitive. Estimation is done with fixed firm effects, industry 
effects, time effects and robust standard errors. Variables are defined in the section 2. ***, ** and * represent 
level of significance at 0.1% 1% and 5% respectively. 
5.2. Determinants of ICFS groups for only listed firms 
In this sub-section we use Tobin’s q together with sales accelerator to represent growth 
opportunities of firms. This makes our results comparable to the existing literature which uses 
Tobin’s q to represent growth opportunities of firms. We use the same method as we used earlier to 
divide firms into the three ICFS groups: NCF-sensitive, CF-insensitive and PCF-sensitive firms. We 
classify firms as PCF-sensitive if CFS is greater than 0.0457, NCF-sensitive if CFS is less than -0.0272 
and as CF-insensitive if CFS lies between -0.0272 and 0.0457. Based on this classification 85 firms 
are classified as NCF-sensitive, 511 firms as CF-insensitive and 173 firms as PCF-sensitive. 
Table 7 presents the results of the multinomial logistic regression to examine the factors 
that are likely to influence firms in being classified as PCF-sensitive or NCF-sensitive to the base 
case of being CF-insensitive. The results in the first column present the propensity of a firm to be in 
PCF-sensitive group against CF-insensitive group. It suggests that firms with higher operating 
income and growth opportunities as measured by Tobin’s q are more likely to be PCF-sensitive than 
CF-insensitive. However, PCF-sensitive firms are likely to be less mature and have lower slack and 
debt service burden. The results on operating income and debt service burden is contrary to the 
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popular notion in the literature, if we interpret the PCF-sensitive firms as financially constrained 
and the CF-insensitive firms as financially unconstrained. 
The results in the second column present the propensity of a firm to be in NCF-sensitive 
group against CF-insensitive group. It suggests that firms with firms with higher growth 
opportunities as measured by Tobin’s q, higher dividend payout and lower maturity are more likely 
to be NCF-sensitive than CF-insensitive. The result on dividend payout is contrary to the popular 
notion in the literature, if we interpret the NCF-sensitive firms as distressed or most financially 
constrained and the CF-insensitive firms as financially unconstrained.  
Table 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression (Only listed firms) 
Dependent variable: ICFS-dummy PCF- Sensitive NCF-Sensitive  
Cash flow/K 0.0291 -0.0042  
Log sales 0.1118*** 0.0023  
Accelerator/K -0.0023 0.0019  
Tobin’s q 0.1717** 0.2978***  
Log age -0.6108*** -0.5763***  
Short term debt/K 0.0120 0.0122  
Long term debt/K 0.0151 0.0039  
Slack/K -0.0651* 0.0102  
Tangible assets/K 0.0042 0.0089  
Dividend payout/K 0.0887 1.5805***  
Interest coverage -0.1398* 0.0010  
Export sensitivity 0.1878* -0.0468  
Group affiliation 0.0758 0.1371  
Prob > chi2 0.000  
Number of NCF-sensitive firms 85  
Number of CF-insensitive firms 511  
Number of PCF-sensitive firms 173  
Note: This table presents the results of multinomial logistic regression with CF-insensitive firms as base 
group. Estimation is done with fixed firm effects, industry effects, time effects and robust standard errors. 
Variables are defined in section 2. ***, ** and * represent level of significance at 0.1% 1% and 5% 
respectively. 
The results in the table 8, using a simple logistic regression, present the propensity of a firm 
to be PCF-sensitive against NCF-sensitive. It suggests that firms with higher operating income and 
lower dividend payout are more likely to be PCF-sensitive than NCF-sensitive. The result on 
dividend payout is contrary to the popular notion in the literature, if we interpret the PCF-sensitive 
firms as less financially constrained than the NCF-sensitive firms. 
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Table 8: Logistic Regression (only listed firms) 
Dependent variable: ICFS-dummy Coefficients 
Cash flow/K 0.0304 
Log sales 0.1149** 
Accelerator/K -0.0056 
Tobin’s q -0.1446 
Log age -0.0592 
Short term debt/K 0.0005 
Long term debt/K 0.0166 
Slack/K -0.0618 
Asset tangibility -0.0169 
Dividend payout/K -1.1956*** 
Interest coverage -0.1214 
Export sensitivity 0.2713 
Group Affiliation -0.1245 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Number of NCF-sensitive firms 85 
Number of PCF-sensitive firms 173 
Note: This table presents the results of a simple logistic regression to investigate a firm’s propensity to be 
classified as PCF-sensitive as opposed to NCF-sensitive. Estimation is done with fixed firm effects, industry 
effects, time effects and robust standard errors. Variables are defined in the section 2. ***, ** and * represent 
level of significance at 0.1% 1% and 5% respectively. 
The overall results suggest that the interpretation of NCF-sensitive, PCF-sensitive and CF-
insensitive as distressed, financially constrained and financially unconstrained, respectively, can be 
contested based on the signs of the coefficients. The possible reasons for this, as argued before, can 
be: first, if cash flow is used to measure internal liquidity of firms without accounting for the 
information contained in it about growth opportunities of firms, we may get biased results. Second, 
not allowing firms to change regime in the sample period is too restrictive because their regime 
may change with any new shock, positive or negative. Moreover, the assumption of monotonic 
pattern of ICFS with the sorting variable(s) is also contested by some of the variables. 
7. Conclusion 
An important debate in the literature relates to the use of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
to measure finance constraint faced by firms. This debate is mainly grounded on four issues: Firstly, 
a priori sorting of firms based on their likelihood of financing constraint which implicitly assumes a 
monotonic relationship of the sorting variable(s) with financing constraint. Secondly, the treatment 
22 
 
of distressed firms in the analysis of finance constraint faced by firms. Thirdly, the use of cash flow 
to represent only internal funds of firms, neglecting information contained in it about future growth 
opportunities of firms. Fourthly, not allowing firms to change regime in the sample period, which 
may potentially change with any new positive or negative shock is restrictive.  
In order to explore these issues, this paper examines the determinants of investment-cash 
flow sensitivity without relying on ex ante classification of firms into distressed, constrained and 
unconstrained groups. We use firm level estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity and use them 
to group firms into NCF-sensitive firms, CF-insensitive firms and, PCF-sensitive firms. This overall 
evidence suggests that, at start-up, the NCF-sensitive firms have positively significant investment 
but negatively significant cash flows implying they are mainly financed by external sources. 
Moreover, this negative relationship forms a pattern since both the variables remain stationary 
with age. The CF-insensitive firms start with high level of investment and an insignificant level of 
cash flows. But, their investments remain stationary and the cash flows rise with age. The PCF-
sensitive firms start with higher level of investment than the other two groups and their cash flow 
level is also higher. But, their investments and cash flows both remain stationary with age. Further, 
we use a multinomial logistic regression model to study the determinants of ICFS in the three 
groups. The results suggest that the interpretation of NCF-sensitive, PCF-sensitive and CF-
insensitive as distressed, financially constrained and financially unconstrained, respectively, can be 
contested by the data. We suspect that the possible reasons for this can be the aforementioned four 
criticisms. 
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